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Firewalls are set up to protect computer networks. Originally, networks were just coupled
together, in order to achieve connection. With the ability to reach networks all over the
world, one started to denote this the Internet. When the Internet evolved, the focus
of design was on connectivity, efficiency and reliability, but not on security. Gradually,
the need to control the traffic gave rise to enhanced security features of the routers
connecting the networks. In the 1990s this was no longer sufficient, because people were
able to circumvent this simple barrier. Dedicated devices then developed into more
advanced mechanisms. The concept of a digital firewall was born.
Today a plethora of threats to a network challenge the firewall and organisations who
are managing the firewall system. This thesis will go into the many tasks involved in
managing a firewall system. We will look at challenges but also suggest solutions to
some of the issues.
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Firewalls originally separated the parts of a building most likely to have a fire. This
would typically be the kitchen, described by Lightoler [1]. By preventing or slowing
down the spread of fire, both lives and property were saved.
In the modern setting, we would like to protect computer networks.
Internet stems from ARPANET, a research network developed in a project sponsored by
the US military. Due to the concerns of the sponsor, several important servers located
in different parts in the country needed to be connected, to avoid single point of failure.
This was such a big success, so the universities copied the idea. The design objective
was to connect different networks. The military assumed a closed network, so at first
security was not important. When more networks and computers were interconnected,
people started using the big network in all sorts of ways. One aspect was trying to
break into systems. The motivations for breaking in could be to show technical skills,
to manipulate information, or to gain economical benefits to mention a few. Steve Jobs
even described this in his biography [2][p.47], were he and a friend sold an illegal device
they baptised : ”the blue box”. With this device it was possible to get access to the
telephone system and call for free.
Some sort of better protection of the systems connected to the Internet was obviously
required. On one side was the need for openness, i.e. to be able to connect to any
computer that one is entitled to access. On the other side was the need for secured
access.
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1.1 What are firewall systems ?
A network router is designed to send and receive Internet Protocol (IP) traffic. We can
add an Access Control List to open or stop specific IP-addresses or IP-subnets. Then
we call this routers with packet filters. This is the simplest form of firewalls, because
they can accept or deny traffic in and out of a network. A router operates on the 3 first
layers of the OSI stack : physical, link and network.
A more specialised device for just looking at one type of service, is called an application
layer firewall or proxy. This device looks thoroughly at one type of application or traffic,
e.g. webtraffic at tcp port 80. Now we move up in the OSI stack to layer 4 - 7. Here
we have the ability to check the webtraffic for computer viruses and stop traffic trying
to access websites that are blacklisted. This is definitely more advanced than a router,
but the disadvantage is that we would need a proxy for every application or service the
computers are using. In other words this does not scale well.
A modern firewall has the ability to keep track of packets and to know what state the
sessions are in. The term stateful inspection denotes this feature. This is necessary
to stop sophisticated attacks. An example is an attacker sending packets from the
outside to a server, but not replying to the server’s responses. The server could run
out of bufferspace waiting for communication that will never take place. A firewall can
terminate this more quickly and stop the attacker.
A firewall can perform both the function of a router and an application layer gateway.
In addition it has the capacity to handle all sorts of traffic and in theory stop all kinds
of attacks.
This thesis looks at firewall systems protecting large networks. The vendors of firewall
systems classify this as their high end models or enterprise systems.
Smaller networks for approximately 50 people or less can use the vendors’ low end
systems. A server running Microsoft Windows or Linux has the option to set up an
inbuilt firewall, but host based firewalls are not part of the thesis.
We assume some knowledge of computer networks, but (hopefully) explain components
and terminology as they appear.
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
First we put firewalls in the context of network systems, how they fit in and how to
classify them. Then we need to look closer into a typical configuration, to get a better
understanding of how components function together.
With several vendors to choose from, a comparison gives an overview.
Feedback from managers of enterprise systems gives confirmation and correction to some
hypothesis of firewall systems.
At the end we give some advice on how to better handle a firewall system and suggest
how to cope with future threats. The last part is summing up what we found and point
out future questions to investigate.
Chapter 2
An overview of a firewall system
The term NGFW (Next Generation Firewall) arose in 2012 due to new functionality;
mainly the ability to recognise applications, i.e. level 7 in the OSI model. Combined
with integration of users/groups ( like Microsoft Active Directory), it created a more
powerful control of traffic.
2.1 Overview of a typical firewall system
A minimum configuration for enterprises can typically look like Figure 2.1. A NGFW
consists of 3 a management station, 2 a security gateway, 4 a central machine for
logging. 1 is internet and 5 is server and pc-network.
Figure 2.1: Enterprise network by courtesy of
Check Point
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2.2 Features
Traffic inspection is performed by the security gateway. The gateways are set up in
a cluster to avoid single point of failure and they do the actual ”work”. The security
policy of the company is controlled from the management station, and out of the security
policy rules are created and managed. The rules are checked and pushed to the security
gateways in a process often termed as ”burning” the rule set. Consolidation of logs
and report generation are typically done on the central logging machine. To efficiently
retrieve forensic evidence or advanced search results, a good logging system is essential.
In a large enterprise the amount of data demands a dedicated server for logs.
2.3 Setup of a new firewall system
This section explains how a minimum configuration might look like. A few rules in the
rule-base are more or less standard, because they are common to most organisations. An
example is the last rule, called the cleanup rule. Here everything is dropped and often
logged. The bigger the organisation is, the longer and more complicated the rule-base
will be to accommodate their different needs.
2.3.1 Security gateways
A security review must be based on the security policy of the organisation. This will
produce a list of security objectives to adhere to.
Requirements for auditing follows the security policy and the scope can be small or
large. For instance, if a security incident needs to be used as evidence in the court of
law, correlated date and time is crucial.
One might also certify for ”Information Security Management” or more popularly ”IT
Governance” : ISO 27001 [3], where all of these themes are important.
An acceptable trade-off between security and performance for filtering has to be decided.
Both logging and inspection of traffic are resource demanding (CPU, memory and disk).
Applications need to be detected, otherwise Palo Alto has illustrated in Figure 2.2
that the situation becomes unmanageable. Previously one opened tcp port 80, and the
application could tunnel all sorts of traffic inside this port. With application control and
classification, one can ”look” inside the session and accept or deny part of the connection.
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Figure 2.2: Classification of applications irrespective of port.
A NGFW is GUI-based, but a Command Line Interface (CLI) for specific features and
options can sometimes be necessary.
The gateways perform the actual filtering and packet inspection, and there are 9 different
protections or functions (as in Figure 2.3) to configure. Each of these have their own
Figure 2.3: Menu of protection options (Check Point).
rule set.
2.3.2 Management
A separate management station is recommended, both for performance and for separa-
tion of services.
An enterprise system also would have a machine for analysing and correlating logs into
events. From the management station or a dedicated application one can search logs,
create reports, and handle anomalies based on findings. An example of an event man-
agement menu is in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Event management menu (Check Point).
Categories of business or organisation can have regulations both international (PCI
DSS) and national (”Finanstilsynsloven” for Norway). An example taken from PCI
DSS version 1.2 requirement 1: ”Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect
cardholder data.” Check Point has an option to buy a compliance-check for the rule
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set. This option automatically inserts missing rules so the organisation is correctly
configured.
Secure intercommunication for gateways, management and other modules is based on
internal certificates. The management station is acting as the Certificate Authority.
The firewall system will setup internal (or implied) rules in the rule set for this purpose
and place it as the top entries. Implied rules have to be first due to the necessity to
communicate internally between the modules in the firewall system. The management
and gateway cluster must verify communication, before an update of firewall rules can
take place. Likewise the gateway cluster must verify the central log server, before logs
are transferred.
2.3.2.1 Problems in management
The increasing number of functions and protections to configure, makes it challenging
to choose the correct option. The functions can best be described as layers.
When the rule base becomes larger than 100 rules, it can be difficult to insert a new
rule in the right place. How do we know if a rule further down is more restrictive or
more permissive ? The firewall software performs checks for this, but can fail to assist
if one use many objects or groups in a field. The advantage with putting several objects
in a group, is that it becomes more readable and can give a better overview. The
disadvantage is that the number of objects can get very high, for instance more than 50.
In addition, if groups are used in many rules or in many fields in the rule, it becomes
hard to know if the logic is correct. This is due to the number of combination of fields
(like 5 in each rule) and rules.
On top of that, we have seen that there can be up to 9 different functions (Figure 2.3) to
configure, each with some form of a rule set. Then we have to decide the right amount
of logging in the firewall system.
In a big company there might be even different vendors of firewalls, and enforcing a new
policy across the whole network often is complicated and takes time to complete.
2.3.3 Additional components
DDOS stands for Distributed Denial of Service and statistics show that attack trends
are on the rise [4]. Typically a choice of DDOS-defense is becoming more and more
necessary. In a big enterprise one would set up separate appliances for DDOS. An
appliance is a specialised, high performance hardware device with limited configuration
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ability. The Internet traffic is terminated in the DDOS appliance and is forwarding
filtered traffic to the gateways.
IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) are taking care of the most advanced threats. IPS
is a protection that can be installed on the gateway. IPS can be extremely resource
demanding when performing deep packet inspection, and therefore is has the option to
be separated to offload the gateways. An IPS appliance can be connected next to the
gateways in parallel.
2.3.4 Cloud security
Various services are moving to the cloud. A cloud is an extremely big and professional
datacenter. There can be several such datacenters on each continent. Amazone, Mi-
crosoft and other cloud providers are offering virtual computers, backup and storage
to a low price. There are also several virtual products to handle the security in these
systems. Gartner [5] has estimated that only 5% of the companies using cloud services
are including a virtual firewall. There seems to be a scepticism on how to trust a virtual
appliance above the hypervisor layer. The hypervisor is placed right on top of the the
physical layer, and is a software module simulating the functions of the physical layer.
The various operating systems installed on a virtual machine, thinks that they are in-
teracting with the physical layer but instead it is actually the hypervisor. A firewall
gateway is inserted on the lowest (physical) layer in the OSI stack. In a virtual environ-
ment the hypervisor exists between the firewall and the physical layer. This means the
firewall gateway has given away some control and must trust others. A security survey
published by Budapest University of Technology and Economics [6] clearly indicates
the need for improved tools and countermeasures in virtualized environments. They
found several attack vectors to use on the guest machine, the host machine and on the
hypervisor layer.
2.4 Outsourcing.
Given the laboursome task of supporting a complete NGFW, some may opt to outsource
this chore. A general security company in Norway (Infratek) has chosen this model, by
using a security firm (Cumulus IT) responsible for computer and communication security.
One might also choose the ISP as responsible for setting up the firewall. This has been
suggested by [7].
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In the case of cloud computing, one could let the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) take care
of the firewall system. Last year this idea was discussed at the IEEE 8th International
Conference on Industrial and Information Systems by [8].
Chapter 3
A survey of some firewall research
papers
All firewalls have a rule set, defining traffic going into and out of the different networks.
A more detailed example (Table 3.1) is described later.
The rule set is the key element to control traffic. We have seen that a firewall system
consists of many layers of protection. Efficiency considerations demand the packets to
be stopped or passed on with the first match in the rule set.
3.1 The Structural Firewall Query Language and Firewall
Decision Diagrams
In 2009 Liu and Gouda published a paper [9] focusing on query processing time for the
firewall rule set. First they describe the firewall query by introducing a SQL-like query
language : Structural Firewall Query Language (SFQL). They also propose a new query
processing algorithm called FDD (Firewall Decision Diagram). Experiments conducted
showed the efficiency by using less than 10 milliseconds to process a query over a firewall
that has up to 10 000 rules. Here a tree-structure is also used to represent the firewall-
rules, and so the processing of queries is quicker than a linear search. A firewall is
denoted ”consistent” if no two rules in the firewall conflict and ”inconsistent” otherwise.
Note that a firewall with conflicting rules is logically inconsistent, but semantically
consistent because of the first-match. Semantical consistency could also be called op-
erational consistency, because first-match simply means that a packet is accepted or
dropped by the first rule that gives a match. It is easier and more efficient to process
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queries on a consistent firewall type. Liu and Gouda convert any firewall, consistent or
inconsistent to an FDD. The query is done on the FDD, which is always compact and
consistent.
In [10], Alex X. Liu extends FDD further. Actually Liu suggests a new design of fire-
walls. Structured firewall design is aiming to achieve : 1) Correct rule ordering. 2)
Thorough consideration of traffic. 3) Keeping the number of rules small. Some other
improvements are redundancy rules removal and firewall query processing. Liu claimed
in his article that the aims were reachable.
In 2012 Alex X. Liu [11] published an article on firewall policy and the impact of change.
With hundreds or thousands of rules, it is no easy task to implement new rules or to
modify existing ones. As a consequence, most firewalls on the Internet have policy errors
[12] and [13, p.58–65].
Rules can be deleted, inserted, modified, and swapped. A tool takes the current policy
and the proposed changes and outputs the impact of the change. Traffic that will be
accepted and/or dropped can be verified as intended before the actual change is made,
hereby reducing errors and greatly assisting in management. If we look at Table 3.1, we
can see an example of change of source IP in the first field in the first line that would
result in wrong policy. Now the first rule will accept source IP from the last rule, and
this is wrong since the rules have different decisions in the last coloumn.
Src IP Dest IP Src Port Dest Port Protocol Decision
10.3.5.∗ 172.18. ∗ .∗ ∗ ∗ IP Accept
... ... ... ... ... ...
10.3.5.100 172.18. ∗ .∗ ∗ ∗ IP Deny
Table 3.1: Conflicting policy
For an unordered rule set, we define a variable d for packet-fields to be at most 5. This
is like the first 5 coloumns in Table 3.1. The number of rules denoted variable N and
varies from 1 (ordered rule set) up to N, which is for the worst case of an unordered
rule set. Time and space analysis gives a worst case O(Nd), but in practice performs far
better. O() means order and is reducing a (complicated) formulae to the component that
is growing fastest when the numbers in the variable approaches infinity. The algorithm
was tested on both artificial and real-life firewalls, and gave similar results.
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3.2 Automatic Correction of Firewall Policy Faults
Chen, Liu, Hwang and Xie [14] formed a group to look into automation of the correction
of policy faults. Policy fault is defined as misconfiguration. A faulty firewall policy can
evaluate some packets to unexpected decisions. They denote such packets misclassified
packets. They proposed an approach to automatically correct all or parts of misclassified
packets of a faulty firewall policy. Then they tested this on real-life firewalls and found
it to be effective on 3 types of faults :
(1) Wrong extra rules. The administrator adds a new rule, but forgets to delete old
rules that filter a similar set of packets.
(2) Wrong decisions. This type of fault indicate that the decisions of some rules are
wrong.
(3) Wrong order. This type of fault indicate that the order of rules is wrong.
Clearly it is very useful to correct human introduced misconfigurations in a large rule
set.
3.3 Towards a New Design of Firewall
In 2013, Khummanee and Khumseela published a paper [15] focusing on the firewall rule
set. The rule structure can be viewed as two parts : <predicate> → <decision>.
The first part consists of IP-adr, port-number and protocol, and the last part is simply
”Accept” or ”Deny” as the rightmost coloumn in Table 3.1. This sounds simple enough,
but rules are often in conflict, unnecessarily complex, difficult to understand, improperly
aligned, and incorrect due to administrator’s ignorance. The authors of [15] propose
two improvements : (1) Single Domain Decision (SDD) firewall - a new firewall rule
management policy that ensures no matching rules can have both ”Accept” and ”Deny”
decision. They prove that they can eliminate Ehab S. Al- Shaer [16]’s four anomalies
(Shadowing, Correlation, Generalization and Redundancy). To compensate for the extra
cost of generating more rules, they solve this by : (2) Binary Tree Firewall (BTF) - a
data structure and an algorithm to fast check the firewall rules. To get the rules logically
correct, they need to split some rules and as a result the number of rules are increased.
How much the number of rules increase is not stated on average or otherwise.
A generic firewall typically has an average verifying time of O(N2). SDD and BTF
improves this to O(log N) in their experiments see Figure 3.2. They measured execution
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times for general firewall rules and SDD separatly. The numbers were produced by
simulation software written in Java language and run on a PC with Microsoft Windows
7.
Figure 3.2: Average verifying time versus number of rules
Commentary : The improvements look impressive, but it is not noticeable if the number
of rules is less than 1000. Only big organisations with a complicated and long rule set
will gain on average verifying time.
An improvement of verifying time from speed O(N2) to O(log N) is a simplification.
Most of the times we have a constant involved, and the order O comes into play when
the number (N or rules) goes to infinity.
We also have to keep in mind that the results are from simulation, and not from a real
world firewall system.
Chapter 4
Modelling firewalls as part of a
CAS
4.1 What is a CAS ?
A CAS is a Complex Adaptive System. The brain, power grids, ecosystems and the
internet can all be represented as large complex networks. A complex system has many
interactions between its different parts causing emergent properties. Emergence denotes
global behavior caused by interacting local behavior generated by a large number of
elements. The complexity can be reduced by removing interactions. Dynamical processes
are described by Barrat [17].
If we look at the development of the number of protections and functions a firewall can
offer, we see in Figure 4.1 that it can be a challenge to manage all of this.
Figure 4.1: Development of functions over time.
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Protection is when a firewall can defend against a threat, for instance stopping access
to hacking-sites by the URL filter. A Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) is not a CAS,
but a complicated system. It is possible to foresee the consequences of disabling logging
or the VPN-feature. The NGFW operates in a CAS environment with people, Internet
and so on.
4.2 How does malware spread on the Internet ?
Human infectious diseases and epidemiology may serve as analogies to malware spread-
ing. Malware is an abbreviation for malicious software and is a common name for evil
software. To illustrate a very simplistic example, we can set up a small differential equa-
tion. Let I(t) be the number of infections at time t and dI(t)/dt be the epidemic rate.
A homogeneous model implies exponential growth from initial condition I(0) = I0 and
β is the rate of contact to other hosts :
I(t) = Iβt0
In practice the computers in many networks are connected in scale-free networks like a
business network or the Internet. Scale-free network is were the vertices (like computers)
have a small number of edges but a few (like the firewalls) have a large number of edges.
Edges in this topology can be seen as connections. A malware is mostly targeted to the
same type (i.e. homogeneous) of computers (e.g. Microsoft Windows XP, Apple OS X)
or software (e.g. Java version 6, Adobe Reader 9). The spreading will be faster on a
scale-free network compared to a random network [18, p.258]. We can set up a differential
equation that fits more accurately. Pasor-Satorras and Vespignani [19] suggest a more
sophisticated equation, but the simple equation is illustrating the principle.
The ultimate goal of the mathematics behind this theory is to bring insights into how
defenses can be built to limit the spreading of malware. Thomas M. Chen and Nasir
Jamil [20] demonstrate a modified community of households (COH) model, that dampen
a worm outbreak by limiting bandwidth.
To simulate the spread of computer virus, one can use the software : ”Netlogo” as a
visual and dynamic demonstration.
4.3 How to limit the effect of malware.
Immunisation of hubs on a network is described as quite effective by Anderson [21], R.
Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani [22] and Barrat [17]. A hub is a vertice in a graph
Chapter 4: How to limit the effect of malware. 16
or network that has many edges or connections. By concentrating on the hubs, Hole
[23] confirmed this to be the best option for immunisation in simulation to halt malware
from spreading. Domain Name Search (DNS) servers and routers with Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) represent hubs on the Internet. Without these technologies there will be
very limited connection. Firewalls also represent hubs in the internet context, because
they have many connections in and out of networks. With the brand of firewall with the
largest marketshare, one has a type of monoculture or homogeneous network.
Figure 4.2: Instantaneous fractions of isolated nodes (red line) and infected nodes
(green line) in a diverse network.
In Figure 4.2 we see a model of a network with infections, taken from [23]. If the
largest hub is immunised, meaning made permanently resistant to virus attacks, then
the instantaneous fraction of isolated nodes drops significantly.
Firewalls are hard to infect, but a fresh vulnerability was nevertheless discovered. A
Unix Bash vulnerability (covered under CVE-2014-7169 named Shellshock) was publicly
disclosed on 24th of September 2014, and had the possibility to infect firewalls built on
Linux/Unix-code. The Unix Bash shell process certain requests, and vulnerable versions
of Bash can execute arbitrary commands. A malware can exploit unpatched Bash shells
and gain unauthorized access to the system. To test if a system was vulnerable, one
could type this command :
env x=’() :;; echo vulnerable’ bash -c ”echo this is a test”
If the word vulnerable was displayed, your system was definitely affected. By 25th
September 2014, Andy Greenberg [24] reported that botnets or robot networks based
on compromised computers were being used by attackers. Two of the biggest firewall
vendors (Check Point and Palo Alto) had to inform their customers and deliver a patch
quickly.
By controlling traffic flow, a firewall’s ability to stop malware spread is one form of
immunisation. A method is to blacklist callhome URLs of Trojans. A Trojan is a
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malware program and often part of a botnet. That means a PC can be infected by a
Trojan, but the Trojan will be stopped when trying to communicate back to command-
and-control (C&C) server. The firewall manager will get a report on all PC’s being
infected by such Trojans, and from this one can take action.
4.4 Pitfalls in management operations
To immunise the firewalls sounds simple enough. The vendors highly recommend to
always install the latest software version of their product. The advantage is that then
we will have the most updated features and fixed software-bugs. The disadvantage is
that there will inevitably be introduced new errors in the software. A simple metric like
Source Line of Code (SLOC) and history confirms this. SLOC and number of defects are
strongly correlated [25]. A rate of one bug per 1000 lines of code is a conservative esti-
mate. Ten to fifteen percent of security patches introduce new vulnerabilities, according
to [25].
Every new version of firewall software has a list of errors fixed. The following documen-
tation [26] from : ”Check Point R77.20 Resolved Issues” is quite common.
Bugs in the firewall software have caused serious disruptions. A national example from
Norway 12th of June 2014 when most people had problems using their credit- and debet-
cards. This was due to a software-update of a Check Point cluster at Evry AS [27].
Chapter 5
Comparing different vendors
Greg Young, Adam Hils and Jeremy D’Hoinne have written the newest Gartner report
[5] from 15th of April 2014 and it gives a good overview of the situation in the firewall
market. Gartner aims to help companies considering to buy or switch firewall system.
The report studies purpose-built appliances for enterprise corporate networks. Appli-
ances must be able to support single or multiple firewall deployments and corresponding
capable management and reporting consoles. The report takes into account the marked
share, but also other factors like the ability to launch products according to customer
needs and the company’s vision. Gartner has classified the different vendors in 4 quad-
rants in Figure 5.1, and defined the upper right quadrant to be the most favorable.
5.1 Vendors.
There are several vendors of firewalls, offering products from small systems to large sys-
tems. Free products like : IPtabels, IPCop, M0n0wall for Linux and Windows Firewall,
ZoneAlarm for Microsoft Windows are aimed at mostly protecting a host.
We focus on commercial systems that offer the most complete feature-set for networks.
Vendors here are : Check Point Software Technologies, Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet,
Juniper Networks, Cisco and a handful more. We concentrate on the two names in
the leading quadrant and Fortinet from the challenging quadrant taken from [5] see
Figure 5.1
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Figure 5.1: Gartner : Magic Quadrant for Enterprise Network Firewalls
5.2 3 largest systems of NGFW
Check Point, Palo Alto and Fortinet are dominant players in the field. Technical capa-
bilities of appliances will vary from year to year, so the following comparison is valid for
2014.
5.3 Strengths and weaknesses.
5.3.1 Check Point
Check Point has good and helpful statistics about unused rules and objects. They have
the most comprehensive list of products and scale well. The software can be installed on
a general (prelisted) hw-platform, on appliances, and on virtualized environments. The
offer for managed security is new in the market, as none of their competitors are selling
a similar service.
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They have some open APIs (Application Programmer Interface), and can therefore in-
tegrate with third party tools like Splunk. Splunk is a software program capable of
merging log-data from different systems and offers detailed search-options. In fact, 350
partners can integrate products with Check Point. An updated database of applications
gives better control of traffic. The Check Point management console is ranked highest
by customers with a large number of firewalls. A service provider can manage different
customers from the same console. Check Point serves almost every Fortune 500 company
and has a huge user base [28].
Check Point has subdivided some of the protections and functions (called blades) and
management options (full Eventview and Reports). This is often bundled in a confusing
way and priced separately. High price causes some customers to consider replacement,
according to Gartner. Other competitors have included what Check Point sells sepa-
rately as blades.
5.3.2 Palo Alto Networks
Palo Alto has a novel approach to firewalls. They focus on applications and divide
the network in zones. With full integration to the user database (like Microsoft Active
Directory), this gives a comprehensive control of traffic.
From the user perspective this is quite intuitive and straightforward. Reports are in-
cluded for no extra license. By grouping applications by category, an automatic database
update provides dynamic filtering for new applications. One can fine-tune traffic inside
for instance Facebook, by allowing read for all but write updates only for the Marketing
department.
Appliances run on specialised hardware that process packets in parallel. Palo Alto was
the first vendor with application control, and this is one of the reasons for them being
the second biggest in the market. Their IPS is also ranked high by customers. The
management console is the second most popular and their pricing structure is simple.
Palo Alto has a small third party product support ecosystem. They lack an entry-level
platform for small branches of a distributed enterprise. The clients would like to see
better log handling and management console for big enterprises, according to Gartner.
5.3.3 Fortinet
Fortinet offers appliances with purpose built ASICs (Application-specific integrated cir-
cuit). Advanced Threat Protection can be added and gives a sandbox-environment to
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detect unknown threats. This threat information can be shared with FortiGuard labs to
benefit all customers. Fortinet was founded in year 2000, and has a good marketshare in
the small and midsize business (SMB)-sector with Unified Threat Management (UTM).
UTM are appliances with the most common protections integrated. This product cover
the basic need for most smaller businesses. Now Fortinet is aiming for the bigger en-
terprise market. Fortinet claims they have a large research and development team and
uses it to go quickly to market with new features. Fortinet offers a low price and high
port density in their appliances, compared to Check Point and Palo Alto.
Fortinet’s weak point is searching in logs if you have gigabytes of data. With no separate
tool for searching, a slow and inflexible user experience appears. The management con-
sole is not suited for environments with many different firewalls and configurations. The
enterprise sector demands other and more advanced features and management compared
to the SMB-sector. Comparisons summarized in Table 5.2, market share of security ap-
pliance from [29]. Cisco has the biggest marked share (18.4%), but many small vendors
togehter sum up almost 50 %.
Criteria CheckPoint PaloAlto Fortinet
Appliance X X X
VM alternative to Amazone EC2 fw X X X
Management console excellent good average
Advanced search in logs X X
Application database X X
Performance high high high
Market share (%) 12.9 7.1 7.3
Cost high high low
Table 5.2: Comparison of three vendors of NGFW.
Performance of gateway models from midrange to high end in Table 5.3 :
Capacity CheckPoint PaloAlto Fortinet
Firewall throughput 50 - 400 Gbps 20 - 120 Gbps 40 - 560 Gbps
Maximum sessions 10 - 210 Millions 4 - 24 Millions 10 - 280 Millions
Table 5.3: Comparison of gateway specifications from three vendors of NGFW
Firewall throughput is theoretical and tested using stateless protocols and big packets.
If web-browsing were to be used, this would consist of smaller packets and the maximum
throughput value would drop. Maximum sessions or connections are the average rate
per second. This is also in the most favourable situations. You would not achieve so
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many sessions, if for instance each session was passing 10 Gigabit per second of data
traffic. The two measures are in conflict.
In Table 5.3 it looks like Palo Alto have much lower performance, but they measure
always with all protections on. Palo Alto process packets in parallel, and therefore their
performance drops in small steps when one turns on protections. After a protection
is turned on, the performance remains stable. Palo Alto claims that their competitors
include and process protections in serial, and so their competitors performance decreases
linearly for every protection turned on. The Table 5.3 should have been with the same
number of protections turned on, in order to be able to compare performance.
The numbers from Palo Alto are also in favourable situations, but seems more realistic
due to the appliances’ parallel construction.
NSS Labs [30] made an independent performance rating in 2013 Figure 5.4 of different
firewall appliances. Here they for instance found that Fortinet performed less than 50%
of what Fortinet publish as throughput.
Figure 5.4: Vendor claimed vs. NSS rated throughput in Mbps
Chapter 6
Questionnaire
A questionnaire was sent out to some bigger institutions in Norway. The response was
as expected (21 out of about 200). In general, the response to a questionnaire will vary
greatly. In this case, most common reasons for not filling in the questionnaire were that
they are not using firewalls (like universities/colleges in Norway), they could not answer
(company policy) and some did not have time.
We will be careful with drawing firm conclusions, but instead suggest trends. I have
also had meetings with Atea, which provides firewall sale and support to customers in
Scandinavia. Atea claimed that more and more SMB drop internal management of the
firewall. Instead SMB buy support from a professional partner.
6.1 Purpose of survey
We wanted to find out how management is performed, problems with today’s solution
and see if some areas could be improved. Was there a big difference between small
and big companies ? Was the number of years of experience by the persons operating
the firewall system, influencing the average network downtime caused by the firewall ?
What was the distribution of brands of firewalls ? Was there a correlation between a
large number of rules and frequent downtime ?
6.2 Common problems in management
Most people (17) could get statistics on rules not in use, but under half (8) actually did
delete rules not used.
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6 institutions reported that changes in firewall never had caused downtime for their
users. For the others a shorter or longer break once or twice a year was common.
Only one company considered using OpenDNS, described in Ch. 7. 2 companies (one
SMB and one big) are evaluating the option for outsourcing, but most big companies
do not consider outsourcing. Two of the big companies used 3rd party software as extra
aid in management. Big companies also had the biggest number of rules and users, as
expected. The distribution of brands of firewalls ended up with Check Point (13), Cisco
(3) and the rest had other brands. Unfortunately none reported using Palo Alto or
Fortinet.
It seems that average downtime was rare (less than once a year) when the firewall
administrators had more than 10 years of experience . 6 out of 21 had not caused
unplanned downtime when managing the firewall. This is impressive, but such a central
component is very sensitive to failure. That is why the gateways are set up in cluster,
so one gateway can be taken out while not disturbing the data communication for
users. Many incidents can cause the cluster to stop : power outage, memory leakage,
infrastructure fail in the network, software bugs, errors in the rule set of the firewall to
name a few.
We could not find a correlation between a large number of rules and frequent downtime.
6.3 What we found could be improved
Many people (14) wanted a check of their rule-set, but only 2 used a 3rd party software
as aid. The software from AlgoSec, FireMon and Tufin could be too expensive, or
organisations do not have time to invest in it. 18 out of 21 had 100 or more rules, so a
3rd part software could probably be an option well worth to contemplate. A computer
is generally better than a human at checking and sorting large amount of data like a
large firewall rule set.
Less than a third (6) are regularly auditing their firewall. The benefits of hiring a
company for audit could be several. One would get an evaluation of the current setup.
A check to see if regulatory compliance requirements are followed. Identification of
possible shortfalls and deficits. A consideration of alternative solutions and immediate




management of firewall systems
In this thesis, we have stated some issues with firewall systems. In this chapter we
suggest some solutions.
7.1 Utilise inbuilt tools
The vendors have created some tools that they claim will greatly improve manageability.
We take a brief look at some of the options.
7.1.1 Remove unused rules
To improve readability and efficiency, as few rules as possible is a clear goal.
Check Point’s Management Console (from software version R77.0) displays expired rules,
rules not active (that is disabled), and unused rules (that is, with zero hits) as seen
in Figure 7.1. All of these categories can be deleted, improving both efficiency and
readability. About half of the respondents in the questionnaire do not delete unused
rules. If the rule set is growing more than 100 rules, then one has to start considering
deleting unused rules.
When a report-module is included, it will often come with a report for analysis of the
rule set. Even if no changes are recommended, it can give helpful statistics about the
situation and aid in improving the rule set.
Chapter 7: External tools 26
Figure 7.1: Policy overview of rules (Check Point)
7.1.2 Remove duplicate objects and unused objects
Again, to ease the management, we define as few objects as possible. An object is
typically a host (IP-address), a net ( several consecutive IP-addresses), users, TCP-
or UDP-port number or a group of any of these. When a rule is deleted, one has to
remember to delete the objects involved if they are not used elsewhere. 4 people in the
questionnaire do not know how many objects they have defined in one group or one
field.
7.2 Routines
To be able to handle a firewall system efficiently, good routines are essential.
The software needs to be regularly upgraded and patched. Unless one performs this, one
will miss bug fixes, stability and improvements. Memory leaks in the firewall software
can easily halt the gateway from handling traffic. The Shellshock (Ch. 3.3) is another
example of a patch that would require a quick install due to security. Half of the
representatives in the questionnaire are not routinely looking through rules and objects
in their firewall system.
A regular audit of the firewall system, will be a good reminder of regular check and walk-
through. With 6 out of 21 respondents telling they do have audits, here is a potential
for improvements.
7.3 External tools
In Chapter 3 we introduced some research done on firewall systems. None of this is
available as products or included by the firewall vendors.
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There are commercial software tools on the market that can assist in evaluating a current
configuration of a NGFW.
AlgoSec, FireMon and Tufin are examples of independent 3rd party tools for checking
and simplifying the rule set. These tools have a broader function and a common name is
: firewall policy management (FPM). Big companies use FPM, because their solutions
are comparatively larger than SMB companies. From the questionnaire only the big
organisations (2) used FPM.
7.4 Managed Security
Security-aware businesses, like banks for instance, are hiring in 3rd party companies
specialising in security. We also note that Check Point is offering managed security
that is checking IPS, logs and so on 24/7 for known and new threats. The service is
called : ”ThreatCloud Managed Security Service”. Check Point together with partners
are continuously harvesting logs from several nodes around the world. By examining
and correlating this huge amount of information, they are able to extract patterns not
easily picked up by one person or one single company. The service ”Threatcloud” can
be purchased separately, but is without the log-analysis and management.
Experts focusing on a narrow field and spending time to verify possible threats, are doing
a much better job compared to an individual person/team in a average company. Both
time and people with in-depth knowledge are mostly what organisations are missing.
Only 2 companies in the questionnaire are currently considering outsourcing of the
firewall services.
7.5 DNS
DNS is an acronym for Domain Name System, and is the way computers resolve URLs
into IP-addresses. With the right name but the incorrect IP, your traffic will be redi-
rected to the wrong server. DNS is vulnerable to incorrect entries, but can also be used
as a filter. That is, only legitimate traffic would pass in and out of a company’s network
because access to hacking URLs would be denied.
7.5.1 OpenDNS and Umbrella
One might ask how OpenDNS can actually benefit in managing threats ?
OpenDNS is a company offering secure DNS as an external service. As stated : to be
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able to navigate easily on the Internet, everybody uses DNS. This goes both ways : to
be able to get out of your own network and for others to reach services on your network.
If all computers in your organisation are forced to use dns-servers from OpenDNS, no
pc will get to blacklisted URLs, according to OpenDNS.
Likewise, known hacker-sites / spam-sites will be denied access from Internet to our
DMZ. DMZ is an acronym for DeMilitarized Zone, and describe a separate part of the
network behind a firewall and reachable from the Internet. Umbrella is a commercial
company that is offering this functionality. They keep track of huge amounts of data and
are analysing IP-addresses (URLs) continuously. ”Good” and ”Bad” sites on Internet
can change, so it is impossible for one person or small team to always be updated on
this. With the right tools and specialised knowledge this is nevertheless now possible.
Umbrella Security Labs have published a case study [31] where they could monitor a
botnet by using recursive and passive DNS from their own openDNS database. Their
point is that one need to examine the DNS-traffic in order to stop the bots from com-
municating. Since 2011 the bots have refined their communication setup, so it is no
longer just a central command-and-control (C&C) server controlling the botnet. This is
explained in Figure 7.2 from Umbrella :
Figure 7.2: Hybrid C&C topology
The firewall vendors will have to adjust their defense to tackle this new bot topology.
7.5.2 Infoblox
The vendor Infoblox originally started with appliance-solutions for internal DNS and
DHCP-services in large organizations. Now they have expanded their products to include
a secure DNS : ”The Infoblox Secure DNS Solution”. Infoblox is performing the same
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functions as OpenDNS, and is a competitor on the market. They also offer a complete
package and a recommendation on how to set up the DNS-service as in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Infoblox setup.
According to Arbor Networks ninth annual ”Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report”,
just over one-third of respondents have experienced customer-impacting DDoS attacks
on their DNS infrastructure during November 2012 - October 2013. An increase from
one-quarter last year.
The disadvantage with both Umbrella and Infoblox is that they are reactive services, like
antivirus. We are able to blacklist the address only when a threat from an IP-address or
URL is discovered. One company answered that they considered to use OpenDNS and
15 companies answered that they would not consider this service.
There could also be privacy issues with OpenDNS. OpenDNS is able to harvest and
store all the DNS and/or URL requests from a company. Potentially this can reveal




We have learned that it is no trivial task to manage a firewall system. For an inex-
perienced person, there is a lot to take in and one has to continuously be updated on
new threats and defense mechanisms. Next Generation Firewall gives you great control
of the traffic-flow, but also adds extra time to manage this. SMB companies are often
not willing to spend the time and money on internal people for firewall management.
Outsourcing is then a viable option.
8.2 Conclusions
From the questionnaire, it seems to be no immediate need for 3rd party tools, even when
the number of rules could be up to 1000. Most organisations would like to correct their
rule set for logical errors, so this is a contradiction. 3rd party tools could be very helpful,
if one is to correct a big rule set.
Most organisations also seem confident with their firewall system, maybe because they
have little downtime and almost everybody had more than 5 years experience with
firewall management.
The majority of respondents would not consider the use of OpenDNS, and that means
their firewall is performing ok. It could also mean that the solution from OpenDNS has
to prove its value and information about the product needs better marketing.
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8.3 Extensions of thesis work
Research is helical [32, p.6–7] like a spiral. More than often new follow-up questions and
studies arise. This is also the case here.
A broader interview-base or worldwide questionnaire would give firmer evidence of find-
ings. We could also correlate the answers to find differences between small and large
organisations.
With added questions about improvements, more suggestions about solutions in firewall
management could be expected to appear.
What is the upper limit of firewall rules one can have implemented, before it gets unman-
ageable ? What is the highest number of objects in a field or recommended combination
of objects and fields ? Is the only solution to purchase products from Tufin, AlgoSec or
FireMon ?
OpenDNS and the service from Umbrella/Infoblox are not tested, so it would be very
interesting to verify if they can give improved protection. One setup could be to have
two identical firewall systems, one with Umbrella/Infoblox and one without. Then test
computers behind the firewalls and see if the number of malware detected is the same.
Appendix A
Copy of questionnaire





Summary of answers to
questionnaire
Appendix 37
How many persons are managing the firewall solution ? 
 
1 5 24 % 
2 5 24 % 
3 6 29 % 
4 or more 5 24 % 
How many rules are configured in the rulebase ? 
 
Less than 50 2 10 % 
50 - 99 1 5 % 
100 - 499 12 57 % 
500 - 999 3 14 % 
More than 999 3 14 % 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Appendix 38
How many groups of rules are configured ? 
 
Not in use 3 14 % 
2 - 9 1 5 % 
10 - 29 4 19 % 
30 - 49 5 24 % 
50 - 99 4 19 % 
More than 99 4 19 % 
What is the largest number of objects defined in one group ? 
 
Less than 8 2 10 % 
8 - 15 3 14 % 
16 - 39 5 24 % 
40 - 99 5 24 % 
More than 99 2 10 % 
Don't know 4 19 % 
 
Appendix 39
What is the largest number of objects defined in one field ? 
 
Less than 8 1 5 % 
8 - 12 1 5 % 
13 -19 4 19 % 
20 - 49 6 29 % 
50 - 99 4 19 % 
More than 99 1 5 % 
Don't know 4 19 % 
Can you get statistics on rules not in use ? 
 
Yes 17 81 % 
No 4 19 % 
Do you delete rules not in use or disabled ? 
 
Yes 10 48 % 
No 11 52 % 
 
Appendix 40
If No, why are rules not deleted ? 
 
Have not enough time 0 0 % 
Too complicated, uncertain of consequences later 2 10 % 
The rule might be used again in the future 2 10 % 
Delete only unused rules after 6 - 12 months 4 19 % 
A combination of 2 or more options 2 10 % 
Other reasons not mentioned 3 14 % 
Is there a need to correct logical errors in the rulesbase ? 
 
Yes 14 67 % 
No 7 33 % 
Do you currently use 3rd party software to analyse and optimise the 
rulesbase ? 
 
Yes 2 10 % 
No 19 90 % 
 
Appendix 41
Do you routinely look through rules and objects in the firewall ? 
 
Yes 11 52 % 
No 10 48 % 
Have changes/maintenace work resulted in down-time for users ? 
 
Yes 15 71 % 
No 6 29 % 
If Yes, how often does this happen on average ? 
 
Less than once a year 12 57 % 
Once a year 0 0 % 
Once every 6 months 3 14 % 
More than once every month 0 0 % 
 
Appendix 42
Is there performed an audit of the firewall solution ? 
 
Yes 6 29 % 
No 15 71 % 
Do you consider the use of OpenDNS/Umbrella as a mean to offload 
the firewall ? 
 
We use this already 0 0 % 
Yes 1 5 % 
Never heard of 5 24 % 
No 15 71 % 
Do you consider outsourcing of the firewall solution ? 
 
Yes 2 10 % 
No 19 90 % 
 
Appendix 43
If Yes, what factors do you include ? 
 
Management is increasingly demanding 2 10 % 
Costly to have experienced people inhouse 0 0 % 
Management of firewall not part of core business 1 5 % 
Availability 24/7 0 0 % 
Other 0 0 % 
How many years have you worked with firewalls ? 
 
Less than a year 0 0 % 
1 - 4 years 2 10 % 
5 - 10 years 10 48 % 
More than 10 years 9 43 % 
What vendor do you have ? 
 
Palo Alto 0 0 % 
Fortinet 0 0 % 
Check Point 13 62 % 
Cisco 3 14 % 
Other 5 24 % 
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